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CHAPTER I
INTP.ODUCTION
"Where food is abundant and men are free, industry
thrives and life is endowed with decency and dignity."^
The evidence is quite clear than an abundant food dsupply can
greatly aid underdeveloped countries in their endeavors to promote econ-
omic growth ant higher standards of living. Unfortunately this need is
not backed up with sufficient purchasing power. As a result millions
continue to live at a bare subsistaiice level in the underdeveloped areas,
with no hope for a better life in the future while the surplus producing
nations are plagued with high surplus carrying costs and relatively
ineffective programs that attempt to bring supply into line with effec
tive demand.
The problem is largely a financial one and not entirely dissimilar
to those that a banker deals with every day. For example, take the case
of a bank with excess reserves. Does the banker try to maintain a high
level of excess reserves or does he try to loan the excess reserves out
to customers having sound investment plans? The answer is obvious.
^Karl B. Mickey, Food in War and Peace, p. 45, International
Harvestor Company; Chicago, 1943.
^Vhen unemployed or underemployed people in the underdeveloped
nations are put to work on new development projects, there is an increased
demand for food. If sufficient food supplies are not available these
nations will be forced to either use their foreign exchange holdings for
food instead of capital equipment needed for development or allow wide
spread inflation which is also harmful to development efforts.
The banker knows that such a loan will not only earn a reasonable rate
of interest but it should also create income for his customers and mean
more business for him in the future.
International loans and aid can also help promote business activity
and create incomes. One needs only to examine the effects of the Marshall
Plan in Europe to discover the validity of that statement. Table I shows
that income and trade were relatively low in 1950 in the four European
countries listed, while United States aid was very substantial to say
the least. By 1957 the positions were reversed. Incomes had gone up and
average of 180 percent, trade had about doubled, and aid had been reduced
over 97 percent. Truly this was an amazing comeback and a boom for the
entire world.
This would all seem to indicate that there is hope that the "excess
reserves of agriculture" can be turned into valuable assets by loaning
them to the underdeveloped nations who can use them effectively. Of
course wheat is not a perfect substitute for dollars, not even in the
underdeveloped areas and it ivould be fool-hardy to compare the post-war
European situation with existing ones in South Asia for instance. How
ever the underlying principle is the same. It takes capital to create
new income and someone has to supply it.
The Problem Situation
Since 1954, the United States has acted to a certain extent as
the "food banker" of the world. In the case of wheat alone, over one
billion bushels were shipped overseas during the first four years of the
XABLH I. 3NC0ME, AID. AND -niADE. SELECTED EUROPEAN COUNTOIES
1950 AND 1957 COMPAilED '
Country Year National
Income
U. S.
Aid
U. S,
Exports
Total
Impor ts
(Billion $) (Million $) (Million $)
France 1950 21.5 616 342 3,030
1957 37.3 30 589 6,110
Germany 1950 17.7 367 400 2,697
1957 38.2 1 956 7,499
Italy 1950 11.0 287 357 1,488
1957 19.6 3 678 3,674
United Kingdom 1950 29.9 949 516 7,069
1957 49.3 22 1,100 11,038
Total 1950 80.1 2,319 1,655 14,284
% change
1957 144.4 56 3,323 28,321
1957 •^180 -97.6 +201 +198
p. 50.
special export proGrams (Public Law 480 and Section 402 of the Mutual
Security Act) financed by the United States government,^' The results
have generally been regarded as very satisfactory in both the receiving
nations and in the United States, However the other major wheat exporting
nations, particularly Canada and Australia, have contended tlat the con
cessional sales replaced their commercial exports significantly. Thus
they claimed the United States is merely shifting much of its surplus
burden on to those who are heavily dependent on commercial wheat exports
to earn them foreign exchange and to maintain the incomes of their farm
populations.
Hie United State's position has been that precautions v;ere taken
to protect the commercial markets of all. However the most controversial
parts of the special programs, barter and concessional sales to indus-
'^s-tions, have been substantially reduced; apparently in recog
nition that those had interfered significantly with commercial experts.
Further the United States has invited the other surplus producing nations
to join them in formulating a cooperative plan for sharing the wheat
surpluses with countries thdt need them.
Statement of the Problem
Before a cooperative plan can be formulated for utilizing the
wheat surpluses in underdeveloped countries, there are three points on
,, . The Hprld Grain Trade, pp. 26-31, Foreign Agricultural Service:
VJashington, 1959,
which the exporting nations will have to agree. 'They are: (1) uniform
terms (rates of interest and repayment, and etc.) for concessional sales;
(2) the level of commercial wheat imports, if any, that the underdeveloped
countries should be required to maintain; and (3) a basis for determining
the quantity of wheat each exporting nation should supply on concessional
terms.
The wheat exporting countries will probably not have much diffi
culty in reaching an agreement on uniform terms.^ The second point
though is a highly controversial issue. Some claim all underdeveloped
areas should be declared non-commercial markets for wheat, while others
contend that all concessional sales should be stopped. It would seem
imperative that this disputed issue be aired in an objective manner if
some basis for agreement is to be found. If the dispute can be resolved,
the way will be cleared for discussion on how to supply wheat requested
on concessional terms. This is a new and important issue which has been
discussed very little up to now.
Objectives
The general purpose of this study was to attempt to establish a
basic rule for determining the level of commercial wheat imports, if any.
^Ihis does not imply that the terras offered will be the best ones
for promoting economic development. While useful concepts on economic
development (reviewed briefly in Chapter II) and valuable statistics on
the incomes and. growth of a large number of countries (see Tables VII,
VIII and IX in Appendix) are available, a great deal more research is
needed before optimum terms can be prescribed.
that the underdeveloped countries should be required to maintain in addi
tion to concessional purchases :.nd to offer a rule and some procedures
that the exporting countries might follow in supplying wheat on conces
sional terms.
The specific objectives were;
1. To determine if underdeveloped countries with low per capita
national incomes could just as well be declared noii-commercial markets
for foreign wheat.
2. To determine if per capita national income can be used as an
indicator of an underdeveloped country's relative importance as a com
mercial importer of wheat.
Hypotheses
In line with the specific objectives, two hypotheses were tested.
They were:
1, Underdeveloped countries with per capita national incomes of
under $100.00 are commercial wheat importers only in years when their
per capita domestic foodgrain production is relatively low,
2. The per capita national income of an underdeveloped country
is an indicator of that country's relative importance as a commercial
wheat importer.
The first hypothesis was derived from claims that the underdeveloped
countries should be declared non-commercial markets for foreign wheat —
the reasoning being that these countries only import substantial quanti
ties of commercial wheat when they are faced with severe food shortages.
To force them to buy on commercial terms then is only taking undue advan
tage of their misfortune and seating back their economic development.
This in turn delays the day when they will be able to be consistent
importers of large quantities of wheat and other products from the more -
developed countries. Concessional terms however, allow them to take
substantial quantities and to improve the level of nutrition for their
people, while also aiding their development.
The second hypothesis results from the fact that wheat is consid
ered superior to other grains used widely as foodgrains in the under
developed countries. Thus an underdeveloped country with a relatively
high per capita income in comparison to other underdeveloped countries,
might reasonably be expected to have a greater effective demand for wheat.
Procedure
The date used in this study have been obtained from a wide variety
of sources; the principle one being the International VJheat Surplus
Ufilization Condercnce Proceedings.^ Other main sources were the offi
cial publications of the United Nation's Statistical Office and Food and
Agricultural Organization, and the United State's Foreign Agricultural
Service, Agricultural Marketing Service, and International Cooperation
Administrative. Much use was also made of ideas expressed in Millikan
and Rostow's A Proposal —Key to an Effective Foreign Policy and in
^Economics Department, South Dakota State College: Brookings,
South Dakota, 1959.
Harper and Brothers: New York, 1957,
W, Arthur Lewis's The Theory of Economic Growth,'^
The first step was to define certain terms and concepts used in
the study. The ones defined were considered either to be unfamiliar to
a large number of people or used differently by different people.
A review of the international food 2ind wheat situations and sur
plus wheat disposal was made in order to place this study in a proper
perspective.
An analysis was made of factors which influence the quantity of
wheat that underdeveloped countries import annually. Thia was done to
test the validity of the hypotheses and to see if a basis could be
uncovered for determining a rule on the level of commercial imports an
underdeveloped country should be required to maintain in addition to
concessional purchases.
After the above analysis was completed, rules or guidelines were
proposed for determining the level of commercial wheat imports that a
country should be required to maintain in additional concessional pur
chases. From there it followed that a rule was needed for the exporting
countries to follow in filling requests for concessional sales. A basis
for such a rule and proposed procedures were outlined. Alternate rules
were also suggested.
The final step was to summarize the study. Statistical tables
which support the tables and figures in the text are given in the
Richard D. Irwin, Inc.! Komewood, Illinois, 1955.
Limitations of the Study
The limitations of this study are many. First and foremost it
should be remembered that the proposals offered are offered simply in
the hope that they may be worth fuller consideration by *more qualified
men. The author makes no claims of fully understanding the intricacies
of surplus disposal programs, of the international wheat economy, and of
international financing. Neither time nor funds were available to
acquire a more thorough knowledge or to develop more complete proposals.
The statistics used in this study are felt to be the best avail
able, Even so, as people familiar with international statistics know,
they need to be interpreted with caution. The author therefore has
sought to use them only to point out trends or very general comparisons;
especially when dealing with statistics derived from different sources.
CHAPTHl II
DEFINITIONS OF TERMS AND CONCEPTS
The terms underdeveloped countries, economic growth, wheat surplus,
surplus disposal, and concessional sales are used widely in this study.
VJhile they are somewhat familiar terms, the understanding of them tends
to vary from person to person. Thus brief definitions and examples of
each at this point should help clarify the meanings attached to them
in this study.
Underdeveloped Countries
Def inition
An economically underdeveloped country is one in which the materi
al living conditions are appreciably inferior to those of more developed
nations. This mass poverty is a chronic condition and not the result of
some temporary set-back. The performance of the country's economy could
be substantially improved by methods that are known and proved.
Per capita national income is the measure used in comparing the
relative development of countries. The use of this measure is possible
only because of the great advances that the United Nations Statistical
Office has made in collecting and publishing national income statistics.
Classif ication
An arbitrary dividing line must be used if one is to classify
countries as either developed or underdeveloped. The one used here is
that of three hundred dollars ($300.00) per capita national income.
Those countries having this level of income or over are called developed
and those below are considered r.iderdeveloped.
Table VII in the Appendix lists the per capita national income
in 1957 for over forty nations. The countries on that list which would
be classified as underdeveloped are as follows:
Argentina Egypt Mexico
Belgian Congo Greece Pakistaui
Brazil Guatemala Peru
Burma Honduras Portugal
Ceylon India Thailand
Ecuador Indonesia
This is by no means a complete list of the world*s underdeveloped coun
tries, It does however show most of the larger ones and those that are
of greatest importance to the surplus wheat disposal question.
Economic Growth
Def inition
Economic growth refers to the phenomenon of a nation's people using
their resources in such a manner that they bring about a sustained in
crease in per capita goods and services. This growth is not just a
natural occurance dependent on the available natural resources. It is
the result of human effort,
A goad measure of economic growth is the rate of increase in per
capita product at constant prices. This can be calculated from the index
numbers of per capita products for some forty countries as published by
the United Nations Statistical Office and as shown in Table VIII of the
Appendix,
The Stages of Growth
This concept dealing with different stages a country passes through
in moving from a traditionally stagnant economy to one of self-sustained
growth, has been developed by Millikan and Rostow of the Massachusetts
g
Institute of Technology.
The first stage is the establishing of the preconditions for
growth. In this period the idea spreads that economic progress is pos
sible, Education and basic utilities are expanded. Growth is limited
because domestic capital is short and even if foreign capital were avail
able, the ability to absorb it effectively is very lew, Millikan and
Rostow estimate that the United States passed through this stage in about
fifty years (1790-1840) but exceedingly good opportunities existed.
The second stage is the take off stage. After passing through
the precondition stage, the nation's economy begins to expand. New
technology spreads as the people are better educated and willing to accept
it. The need for foreign capital is great even though the rate of domes
tic savings is increasing and helping to meet investment demands. It
is estimated that this stafee may last one or two decades. India is a
country thought to be in this stage.
The third stage of self-sustained growth is one of regular but
%I. F, Millikan and W. W. Rostow, AProposal — ^ ^ Effective
Foreign Policy, Harper and Brothers: New^York, 1957,
sometimes fluctuating growth. Modern and efficient production is preva
lent. Domestic savings are about sufficient to meet investment demands
and the need for foreign capital diminishes. This is the stage that the
Ihited States, Canada, most all of the European countries, Australia,
New Zealf.nd, the l^ion of South Africa and Japan are in now.
The Wheat Surplus
It is not possible to define the wheat supplus in objective terms.
The best one can do is define what the major exporting nations consider
to be their surplus stocks.
Def inition
The wheat surplus in a country is that quantity of wheat in excess
of what is considered "normal" or desired carryover. Certain quantities
of carryover are desirable as protection against a short crop or national
emergencies of some sort.
Surplus j^n Major Exporting Countries
Using the above definition, it is necessary to Imow the "normal"
carryovers for the major exporting countries before it can be determined
what part of their total carryovers should be considered as surplus.
Estimates of normal carryovers for the United States, Canada, and Australia
were given in speeches at the International Wheat Surplus Utilization
Conference. Robert Post of the Agricultural Marketing Service used the
figure of 500 million bushels as the desired or normal carryover for the
United States.^ Arnold W, Platt, president of the Alberta Farmer's Union
gave 178 million bushels as Canada's normal carryover,Australia's
normal carryover was stated by R, A, Sherwin, Australian Agricultural
Attache to be approximately 30 to 40 million bushels.These figures
and the author's estimate of 65 million bushels normal carryover for
Argentina were used to calculate the wheat surplus in the four countries
for three alternate years. The results are given in Table II. This
does not give a complete picture of the current wheat surplus however as
the United State's carryovers have been increased sharply since 1957,
There are indications that the United States surplus, as defined here,
may approach one billion bushels by July 1, 1960.
Surplus Disposal
There are essentially three ways for a nation to deal with agri
cultural surpluses: reduce production, increase domestic consumption,
or increase the volume of exports. Special programs to increase the
volume ot exports are commonly called surplus disposal. The best known
and largest surplus disposal programs are those of the United States
authorized by Public Law 480 and Section 402 of the Mutual Security Act.
Canada and Australia have also made some surplus commodities available
under the Colombo Plan for aid to South-East Asia countries.
International h'heat Surplus Utilization Conference Proceedinp-s^
pp. 22 ana ncoiiom.fcs Department, South Dakota State College: Brookines
South Dakota, 1959. " ^
^Qlbid.. page 34.
^^Ibid., page 98.
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Publ ic Law
Public Law 480 was enacecl by the 83rd Congress for the purpose
of promoting tlie economic stability of American agriculture, expanding
internatiooj.l trade in farm products, encouraging economic development
in friendly nations, and furthering the collect've strength of the free
world. Responsibility for these overall objectives was assigned to a
policy committee made up of top officials from the Department of Agricul
ture, CcfiMierce, and State, the International Cooperation Administration
(ICA), and the Bureau of the Budget, The Department of Agriculture heads
a working group, composed of the above agencies plus others, which coor
dinates day-to-day operations of the programs. All disposals under this
law are supposed to be in addition to the usual commercial sales of the
United States and other friendly nations.
Title I of the law provides for the selling of agricultural com
modities for local currencies (the currency of the importing nation).
The negotiations for the sales are made by the United States Government
with other governments but the agricultural commodities are moved through
regular commercial channels. The local currencies accruing to the United
States are used for many purposes; the primary one being for loans back
to the importing nations to be used for economic development projects.
Other uses include those of meeting U, S, obligations abroad, market
development programs for U, S. farm products, and loans to U. S, business
firms or affiliate for business development and trade extension in those
countries.
Title II of the law provides for grants of surplus commodities
to foreign governments in times of famine and other emergency situations.
There is no compensation involved and these grants are only temporary aid
given when disaster occurs.
Title III authorizes the bartering of surplus commodities for
strategic and other materials less subject to deterioration and for giving
surplus commodities to private relief organizations such as CARE, UNICEF,
the Catholic Welfare Service and like organizations. The barter program
tended to displace dollar sales of agricultural commodities and as a
result has been substantially reduced. The donations to private relief
agencies are under SecH.on 416 and are termed "people to people" relief
programs because in effect the people of the United States are giving
the food through the taxes they pay.
Section 402
Congress in 1954 amended the Mutual Security Act of 1951 to in
clude Section 550 which provided for the selling of surplus agricultural
commodities to friendly nations for local currencies. This was changed
in 1955 to Section 402 which is similar to Section 550 except that the
provisions for protecting normal commercial marketings have not been
included. Sales of wheat under this program have been diminishing as
it is felt that it is to the advantage of all nations concerned that the
bulk of such concessional sales be made under Title I of Public Law 480|
which is supposed to protect commercial marketings.
Concessional Sales
The term "concessional sales'* is almost self-explanatory. It is
simply those sales where special terms for payment are given to the
importing countries. The most common types are those under Title I of
P. L, 480 and Section 402, In those the currency of the importing coun
try is accepted in payment and then most of it is loaned back to the
importing countries for development projects. Barter transactions are
also considered as concessional sales.
CMFriiR III
THE SETTING CP THE PROBtEM
The agricultural problems of the world are complex. To place this
study in a proper perspective it was necessary to review the food and
wheat situations of the world, and the surplus wheat disposals made by
the United States. These topics v\?ere dealt with very thoroughly irv
speeches given by recognized authorities at the International Wheat Sur
plus Utilization Conference.
The first section which follows on the food situation is a review
of a paper given by Dr. Mordecai Ezekiel of the Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations.^2 •phe second one on the wheat situ
ation is a review, except for the concluding summary on carryovers, of
the address given by Raymond Vickery from the Grain Division of the United
State's Foreign Agricultural Service.The third section review's the
disposals of wheat made by the United States in past years and the evalu
ation of those disposals as given at the Conference.
VJorld Pood Situation
Agricultural production in the world is about 40% above pre-World
^^Mordecai Ezekiel, "The State of Food and Agriculture Today",
International VJheat Surplus Utilization Conference Proceedings. Economics
Department, South Dakota State College: Brookings, South Dakota, 1959.
13
Raymond Vickery, "A Discussion of Some of the Broader Aspects
of the Current World Wheat Economy", International Wheat Surplus Utili-
zation Conference Proceedings. Economics Department, South Dakota State
College: Brookings, South Dakota, 1959.
VJar II levels. '.Chis is soiiev.'hat more than the world*s population has
increased and per capita consumption has been increasing. There is
however still tiemendous gaps between the diets of the poorer and the
better-fed of the world as production has increased faster in the more-
developed and less-populated areas than in the less-developed and more-
populated areas. As Dr. Ezekiel so aptly stated, "seems the rich do get
richer and the poor poorer,".
Inter'national trade in agricultural products has increased in
recent year -i. Ivhile Europe has not quite returned to its pre-vjar level,
of imports, the Far Hast which was formerly a net exporting area has now
become a .let importer of agricultural products. The increase in imports
has beer, cue in part to the surplus disposal activities of the exporting
nations,
V.'orld economic development appears to be the hope for solving the
twin problem of surpluses and deficits. Surplus disposal can help pro
mote; development, especially in areas such as Asia, where there is con-
si'dcrable room for expanding food consumption.
VJorld Wheat Situation
Production
VJorld wheat production is about 20% above pre-war production,
but per capita production has remained about constant (2,7 to 2.8 bushels)
over the last thirty years. Important shifts though have taken place
in the proportion of total production being produced in certain areas.
The "Big IV" grain exporters, Argentina, Australia, Canada, and
the United States have traditinally produced about one-fourth of the
world's wheat crop. There now appears to be a downward trend in the
proportion they grow. Output has increased considerably in Western
Europe due to intensive cultivation and larger acreages in some countries.
In the U. S. S, R. an even larger increase has taken place and it is now
estimated that >they produce more wheat annually then the "Big IV" do.
Other countries that have significantly increased their wheat production
are Iran, Syria, India, Brazil and Mexico,
A major factor in the foroiation of the world's wheat production
pattern has been government support prices. At present they are used
widely to protect farm incomes or to encourage certain levels of domestic
output.
Consumption
As vtfith production, total consumption of wheat is rising but per-
capita-wise there has been little change over the last thirty or forty
years. There is however two distinct trends in per capita consumption
which tend to offset each other.
In countries where wheat is the main foodgrain and incomes are
relatively high, per capita consumption is slowly declining. It is only
because of growing populations, that their total consumption is remaining
fairly stable.
In the low income countries where rice and coarse grains are
mainly consumed, there is a tendency to increase consumption of wheat
whenever income increase. In these countries per capita and total
consumpticn both are rising.
This tendency is supported by several studies which showed that
up to a certain level of income people will generally increase their
consumptr.on of wheat. Beyond that point, the tendency is to substitute
high protein food such as meat and dairy products for wheat products.
Trade
Record volumes of wheat have moved in international trade in recent
years, again due in part to surplus disposal activities of the United
Stat'is.
The major exporters, the so-called "Big IV", have accounted for
approximately four-fifths of the world's wheat exports for many years.
Recently France has shown signs of becoming a permanent exporter of
considerable note. Russia and Italy also have possibilities for doing
the same.
Europe has long been the major import area of the world. Roughly
half or more of the world's annual exports of wheat have moved to that
market for many years. Lately, European imports have shown what may be
a declining trend due to increased production and fairly stable consumption,
Asia s imports of wheat have grown remarkabley. Imports ran over
350 million bushels annually during the 1956-57 and 1957-58 marketing
years compared to imports of around 70 million in pre-war years. Imports
have also increased in South America and Africa but not to such a great
extent. The pressure of population is not nearly so great in the latter
two continents.
In general, it can be said that Asia offers the best hope for in
creasing the voliuuc of wheat i*i world trade.
Carryover
VJheat that is neither consumed nor exported becomes carryover $tock
and adds to the supply of the follovjing year. These stocks have reached
burdensome proportions in the major exportitg nations, particularly in
Canada and the United States. Stocks in these two are considerably greater
than their annual consumption. The present carryover of the United States
is estimated to be more than 1,250 million bushels.This is more than
the world*s total volume of international trade in Klieat during the 1957-
58 marketing year.
An attempt has been made to illustrate the world's wheat problem
in Figure 1. It shows the world's annual production, available supply,
and apparent disappearance. Available supply is production plus carry
over from the preceding year (carry-in) in the four major exporting coun
tries and apparent disappearance is the difference between the available
supply and the carryover at the end of the year (carry-out) in the same
countries.
Carryover of wheat was no problem in 1951. Large wheat crops in
1952 and 1953, much greater than apparent disappearance, resulted in large
carryovers. These reached approximately one andi-cne-half billion bushels
by 1954. From then through 1956, disappearance kept pace with rising
^^The Wheat Situation. WS-163, p, 7, United States Department of
Agriculture: Washington, D, C., 1959.
Available Supply
"Apparent Disappearance
production and carryovers were held fairly constant. In 1957, disappear
ance surpassed production allowing a slight reduction in carryover stocks.
With world wheat production reaching new heights in 1958, indications are
that 1959 carryover stocks wil^ ^be boosted to over two billion bushels.
It is interesting to note that the years where apparent disappear
ance kept pace with production are the same years in which the United
State's surplus disposal programs have been in effect.
United States Disposals of Surplus Wheat
Magnitude and Recipient Countries
The United States in the first four years of Public Law 480 opera
tions exported nearly twice as much wheat under the special government
disposal programs as they did for cash in the commercial markets. Table
III is a summary of the total wheat exports of the United States during
those years and Table IV lists the countries and the quantities of wheat
they received under Title I.
Concessional sales under Title I accounted for the largest sales,
with concessional sales under Section 402 and barter deals also moving
sizeable quantities. Tible I sales were greatly expanded in the latter
years while the deals under the other two have been restricted. Emer
gency grants under Title II remained fairly constant while the donations
to private overseas relief agencies (Section 416) have been expanding.
Evaluation
Public Law 480 was evaluated in the "Summary of Findings" of the
TAOLE III. U. S. WHEAT^ EXPORTS BY GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS
Title Title Barter Section Section Others Total
I II 402 416 (cash)
- million bushels
1954-55
1955-56
1956-57
1957-58
Total
^Including wheat flour, in grain equivalent.
^Marketing year, July 1 to June 30.
^Shipped under Army Civilian Supply Program.
1,570
Source; The World Grain Trade, pp. 26-31, Foreign Agricultural Service,
U, S. D. A.; Washington, D. C., April, 1959.
TAP3LE IV. U. S. VaiEATl EI^PORTS IJNDER TITLE I, P. L. 480
BY COUNIRY OF D3SINATI0N
Country of
Destination
Austria
Brazil
Chile
China: Taiwan
Colcabia'
Ecuador
Egypt
Finland
Greece
Iceland
India
Indonesia
Iran
Israel
Italy
Jdpan
Korea, S.
Pakistan
Paraguay
Peru
Poland
Portugal
Switzerland
Turkey
Yugoslavia
Total
1954-55 1955-56 1956-57 1957-56
— 1,000 bushels
— 1,455 1,069 1,117
— 15,899 13,551 5,721
— 1,345 6,287 1,198
— —
— 2,036
— 2,186 437 1,885
— 547 492
— 10,784 —
676 3,094 1,845
—— 3,560 8,422 2,921
——
— 018 331
—— — 62,960 68,964
—
— 3,153 103
—— 1,892 2,300 1,102
1,811 4,604 3,208 5,486
— 897
~ 13,680 13,180 4,119
— — 367 3,825 11,152
am w
-- 17,108 20,940
— 988 MM
871 2,807 1,426 1,841
507
1,510
4,108
27,521
94,345
3,373
1,088
22,005
31,952
200,536
10,714
18,339
176,091
^Including wheat flour, in grain equivalent.
Source: ^ Korid Grain pp. 26-31, Foreign Agricultural Service:
Washington, 1959.
4 Year
Total
3,641
35,171
8,830
2,036
4,508
6,945
10,784
5,615
14,903
131 349
131,924
3,256
5,294
15,109
897
30,048
15,344
38,048
988
6, 945
16,277
3,880
2,598
41,156
95,203
494,774
International Wheat Surplus Utilization Conference. It was judged to be
a very good attempt to utilize the surpluses as fully as possible to
speed up the economic development of the poorer countries. It was also
stated tliat the United States and other countries able to help, should
continue and expand their aid to the underdeveloped countries.
The legislative or administrative changes recommended for improving
P. L. 480 were such as to authorize concessional sales for up to five
years in advance, strengthen the safeguards for the exports of other
friendly nations, limit the using of local currencies to meet obligations
that would ordinarily be paid in dollars, give receiving countries more
flexibility in the use of local currency loans, and restrict barter deals
as much as possible.
CIL'lPTEIl IV
WHEAT IMPORTS BY UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES
The level of commercial wheat imports, if any, that the under
developed cou'itries should be required to maintain in addition to con
cessional purchases is a key issue that will have to be resolved before
the exportin-^ nations can agree on a cooperative surplus wheat disposal
program. This issue may not be easy to resolve as the opinions on it
range from those who contend all underdeveloped areas could just as well
be declared non-commercial markets to those who claim all concessional
sales are harmful and should be stopped. The reasons for such diverse
opinions may well be due to the exporting countries thinking of surplus
disposals primarily with regard to their own problems and only secondar
ily with regard to aiding the underdeveloped countries. Since such ap
proaches have not proved fruitful, a new approach which considers primarily
the needs and abilities of the underdeveloped countries is being presented
here.
In this new approach the author examined the general relationships
between wheat imports and food grain production and income in Brazil,
India, Japan, and Pakistan for the years 1951 through 1957. It was hoped
that in this manner the hypotheses as stated in Chapter I could be tested
and a basis might be uncovered that would be useful in determining the
level of commercial wheat imports the underdeveloped countries should
be required to maintain.
Preliminary Considerations
Considerable time was epent in review of literature and discussions
with economists in developing the approach used here. Ihe items that
received major consideration are discussed in the paragraphs that follow.
Factors Considered
The factors considered in analyzing the reasons for different
annual quantities of wheat imports by the respective countries were their
per capita production of major foodgrains and their per capita national
income. It was thought that the per capita foodgrain production would
indicate an underdeveloped country's need for foreign food in that year,
since foodgrains are a major item in the diets of people in poorer lands.
Thus by comparing the annual relationships between wheat imports and per
capita foodgrain production it could be established whether or not a
country was an important importer of wheat only during times of extreme
need or when foreign wheat was available on concessional terms.
Per capita national income was thought to be not only a factor
that indicated a country's relative ability to purchase its food needs
but also a factor that indicated effective per capita demand for wheat.
This is because wheat is generally considered superior as a foodgrain
to other grains, especially coarse grains such as corn, grain sorghums,
and etc., and one would expect higher per capita consumption of wheat in
underdeveloped countries with relatively high per capita income than in
poorer countries.
Population j& also an important factor. It was for this reason
that production and income were placed on per capita terms. However,
since gross wheat imports and not per capita imports were being consid
ered, it was necessary to remember when thinking of imports that India's
population is at least four times greater than the respective populations
of Japan, Pakistan, or Brazil,
Carryover stocks of foodgrains, and of wheat in particular, were
originally thought •. to be a factor worth considering in this analysis.
However information on carryovers was not available for the entire period
and that which was available showed that the overall effect of carryovers
on total foodgrain supplies was very small in most importing countries.
There were innumerable other factors that could have been used.
They were not used because they were felt to be of minor importance in
comparison to the factors employed and because amore detailed analysis
was beyond the scope of this study.
Countries Selected
The four underdeveloped countries selected were Brazil, India,
Japan, and Pakistan. These countries were chosen for several reasol.
First they were the four underdeveloped countries, as defined
in this study, that had received the bulk of United States wheat dis
posals under Title I of Public Law 480 (see Table IV, Chapter III and
they might reasonably be expected to apply for more wheat on concessional
terms in the future. It seemed that they were the key countries to dis-
CUSS in regard to future disposal programs.
Secondly, they represent different levels of per capita national
-.come - Japan at about $250.00, Brazil a little over $150.00, and
Pakistan and India just over $50,00 and $60.00 respectively. This was
important in trying to deterrai: e the effect of per capita income on
wheat iiviports. Since a seven year period did not seem to be long enough
to judge the effect of a change in a country's income on its wheat imr
ports, it was thought that the effect of this factor ocould be judged by
comparing the general level of wheat imports by countries with signifi
cantly different levels of per capita income.
Years Selected
The years 1951 through 1957 were chosen primarily because they
cover years before and during the operation of Public Law 480 and second
arily because the preceding years were not considered normal ones. Japan
was under occupation following the war, while India and Pakistan had just
received their independence and were troubled with the difficulties of
partition.
Procedure Followed
The annual per capita foodgrain production and annual wheat imports
of each country were plotted on the same graph. Per capita foodgrain
production was measured in kilos against the left-hand scale and wheat
imports were given in millions of bushels as measured on the right-hand
scale. A solid line shows total wheat imports for each of the sevens-
years while a broken line shows only commercial imports for the last four
years. The difference between total and commercial imports represents
the quantities of wheat shipped to those countries by the United States
under special export programs.
The purpose of this type of graphic presentation was to bring
out the relationship between domestic foodgrain production and wheat im
ports for the years before and during the operation of Public law 480.
Normally one would expect an inverse relationship between domestic pro
duction and imports. In years where this was not the case, an explana
tion was sought.
This relationship was also used to test the hypothesis that under
developed countries are only important wheat importers during years of
relatively low per capita foodgrain production. The test is whether or
not the country's commercial wheat imports declined to or approached zero
in years of relatively high domestic foodgrain production.
To judge the relationship of per capita national income and Wheat
imports it was necessary to compare the general level of wheat imports
by countries with different per capita incomes. It was anticipated that
countries with the higher per capita incomes (Japan and Brazil) would
also be the importers of the largest quantities of wheat on comniercial
terms. Thus this relationship was used to test the hypothesis tliat per
capita national income is an indicator of underdeveloped countries rela
tive importance as commercial wheat importers. The hypothesis would be
accepted if the general levels of commercial imports by the four countries
followed a pattern similar to their per capita income ratings.
Foodgrain Production and Wheat Imports
The relationship of per capita domestic foodgrain production and
wheat imports in the four countries are illustrated in Figures 2, 3, 4 and
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5. Corresponding tables with the complete data are included in llie
Appendix.
These relationships had to be interpreted with caution as the
data used were not perfectly comparable. The crop year for which pro
duction is given, begins on April 1 for the three Asiatic countries and
on December 1 for Brazil, The marketing years for which all imports are
reported are from July 1 of the year listed to June 30 of the following
year. Thus the crop and marketing years overlapped to a large degree
and were thought adequate to indicate general relationships.
The difference between total imports and commercial imports was
arrived at by subtracting the United State's reported special export
shipments to those countries from the countries total imports as recorded
by the Food and Agriculture Organization, Thus liere again the data used
were not perfectly comparable. However it was felt that the error, if
any, would not be so large as to change the very general relationships
being sought in this analysis.
In India
India imported large quantities of wheat in 1951, 1952, 1956 and
1957. Observing per capita production of foodgrain (rice, wheat, and
grain sorghums) for those years it is easy to see tliat a need existed
for large grain imports in the earlier two year period but the need in
the later period is not so apparent. It can only be accounted for by
explaining the situation in those years.
Self-sufficiency in foodgrain is one of India's production goals
in its drive for economic development. The sharp increase in foodgrain
production from 1951 to 1953^^ made this goal seem reasonable. However,
the decline since then has crer.ved a grave problem for the Indian govern
ment. With deficit financing of development projects providing the people
with more money, domestic foodgrain production was counted on to meet the
increased demand for foodgrains. Since production was not sufficient,
India was faced with rapidly rising foodgrain prices in 1955 and 1956.
Large imports were required to keep down this inflationary pressure.
As shown in Figure 2, the large imports of 1956 and 1957 consisted
largely of wheat obtained on special terms or grants from the United
States. While it can not be ascertained that these concessional imports
did not replace commercial sales that might have been made in their
absence it does seem clear that the concessional sales allowed India to
maintain its planned imports of capital equipment for development projects
It should be pointed out that the wheat imports of 1951 and 1952
also included large quantities of United States wheat obtained under a
"wheat loan" during the 1951 food crisis. Thus the years v;hen small
quantities of wheat were purchased on concessional terms were years of
relatively low imports. However even in those years and later years,
commercial imports seemed to average around 15 to 20 million bushels
annually and it would not seem reasonable to conclude that India was an
important importer only during years of food shortages.
Part of this increase may have been due to wider statistical
coverage rather than an actual increase. The 1953 production was also
helped by favorable weather conditions.
In Pakistan
Pakistanis wheat imports ;.nd per capita production of foodgrains
(rice and wheat) as shown in Figure 3 do not appear to follow a set pat
tern, Wheat imports are up in some years when per capita foodgrain pro
duction is also high. In 1955 foodgrain production dropped sharply and
imports increased much less than would have been expected. However, if
wheat imports are compared only with per capita wheat production (see
Table XIII in the Appendix), an inverse relationship is readily apparent.
The explanation apparently lies in the fact that East Pakistan is a rice
producing and consuming area while West Pakistan produces and consumes
wheat primarily. Thus the 1955 foodgrain shortage of East Pakistan was
really a rice shortage and tliat might explain why large imports of wheat
were not made.
Pakistan also strives for self-sufficiency in foodgrain production
but per capita production did. not show any upward trend during the 1951-
1957 period. West Pakistan might then be expected to import wheat during
years of short domestic wheat production. Wheat exports into East Pakistan
may depend upon Pakistan's economic development and the availability of con
cessional terms.
Pakistan's commercial imports in 1956 and 1937, when compared to
wheat production in those years, seem to have been at the expected level.
It would appear that the concessional imports of those years were in
addition to commercial sales but it may be that East Pakistan was also
having an increased demand for wheat because of economic development.
In the latter cause, it could only be said that concessional purchases
allowed Pakistan to use its foreign exchange savings for other needs.
In Brazil
The picture for Brazil as shown in Figure 4 is quite different
than those for the other countries. While the two factors fluctuated
inversely in most years the outstanding characteristics were the upward
trend in per capita production of foodgrains (corn, rice, and wheat) and
the relative stability of total wheat imports. Since foodgrain produc
tion, and expecially wheat production increased tremendously in this
period one might have expected total wheat imports to decline. Since
they did not it is possible that concessional sales helped keep Brazil's
total imports from declining in this period. Evidence was not sufficient
to judge the situation.
In Japan
Total wheat imports by Japan showed a rising trend for the period.
While imports fluctuated considerably in the first three years, the trend
was very steady during the last four years. Commercial imports from 1954
to 1956 appear to have been somewhat lower than one would have expected
them to be in view of the relationship between per capita foodgrain pro
duction and wheat imports in the preceding years. There may be room for
argument that concessional sales reduced commercial imports significantly.
Japan's per capita production of foodgrains (rice and wheat) showed
a rising trend and also a rather surprising amount of fluctuation from
year to year. It is also noteworthy that Japan's wheat production and
acreage declined steadily from 1954 to 1957. In some qua-ters in Japan
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it is contended that the large concessional imports have affected unfavor
ably their domestic agriculture,^^
Another interesting point is that Japan*s total imports in 1957
were composed largely of commercial purchases. This might indicate that
Japan is nearing a stage where concessional terms are not so essential
for continued high imports.
Income and Wheat Imports
A relationship betvtfeen per capita income and commercial wheat
imports was sought by comparing the general level of commercial imports
into the four countries, each of which had a different level of per capita
income. Since Japan had the highest per capita income, Brazil the next
highest, and India and Pakistan both relatively low incomes, it was won
dered if the level of commercial wheat imports would follow a similar
pattern,
A visual comparison of the commercial wheat imports of the four
countries as shown in Figures 2, 3, 4, and 5 indicates that Japan was
the largest coirunercial importer of wheat. In two of the seven years it
imported approximately ninety million bushels or more on commercial terms
and in no year was its imports much under forty million bushels. Also
its commercial imports comprised a very large portion (about 90%) of its
total wheat imports in 1957.
1 fS
u 0" the Utilization of Agricultural Surpluses for Economic
Development Japan, p. 29, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far
East; Bangkok, Thailand, 1958.
Brazil was considered to be the next most important conimercial
importer, having had imports renging from thirty up to fifty million
bushels annually. Its commercial imports comprised a relatively large
share (about 70%) of its total imports for the years 1955-1957.
India ranked next in order as a commercial importer but it must
be remembered that its population was over four times greater than that
of any of the other three countries. Thus on a per capita basis it would
have to be considered the least important. Its commercial imports made
up a small part of its total wheat imports. The percentage would appear
to be about 15% in 1956 and 1957 when account is taken of the fact that
the commercial imports shown for those years also include some concessional
imports from Canada and Australia.
Pakistan ranked last in the comparisons, having commercial imports
that ranged from zero to about twenty-five million bushels.
Even though these countries did appear to rank in importance as
commercial importers in the same order as their per capita incomes were
ranked, it does not seem reasonable to conclude that per capita income
alone can be used to judge a country's relative importance as a commer
cial importer. The difference in a country's population and in its
wheat production are two additional major factors that would have to be
considered, and there are likely other factors that should be taken into
account.
Conclusions
It has been difficult to draw conclusions from the brief and very
general analysis made. It was possible though to determine the validity
of the hypotheses and to point out what appeared to be a suitable basis
for a rule on the lev^l of commercial wheat imports an underdeveloped
country should maintain in addition to concessional purchases.
The first hypothesis was that underdeveloped countries with per
capita national incomes of under $100.00 are commercial wheat importers
only in years when their per capita foodgrain production was relatively
low. This hypothesis was not borne out by the examination of per capita
foodgrain production and wheat imports by India and Pakistan, This indi
cated that even the very poor countries imported some wheat for reasons
other than a dire necessity for food. It would not seem reasonable there
fore to agree with those who contend all underdeveloped areas should be
declared completely non-commercial markets for foreign wheat. It would
seem fair that underdeveloped countries desiring wheat on concessional
terms should at least maintain commercial imports at the approximate
level of their commercial imports during years of high domestic produc
tion, For the four countries, Japan, Brazil, India, and Pakistan this
would mean average annual commercial imports of about 60-75, 30-40, 15-20,
and under 10 million bushels of wheat respectively.
The second hypothesis stated that the per capita national income
of an underdeveloped country is an indicator of its relative importance
as a commercial market for wheat. This turned out to be an over- simpli
fication, The analysis pointed up other factors of e^ual or more
importance than per capita income.
The analysis also pointed out differences in the need for conces
sional terms on foodgrain imports by countries with significantly differ
ent levels of per capita income. While all four countries were apparently
experiencing increased demands for foodgrains, the two poorer countries,
India and Pakistan, were th ones having the least success in expanding
per capita foodgrain production and also the ones with the least ability
to buy on commercial terms. Thus their needs for concessional terms on
foodgrain imports seemed to be much greater than the needscof Brazil and
Japan, There also appeared to be indications in Japan that concessional
sales might have displaced some commercial imports and adversely affected
domestic production* This all seems to point to the generalization that
underdeveloped countries with relatively high per capita incomes should
be required to purchase a larger proportion of their total wheat imports
on regular commercial terras than countries with lower per capita incomes.
It is best to state the requirements for commercial imports in
proportional rather than absolute terms. There are a number of reasons
for this. The analysis showed that foodgrain production fluctuated con
siderably. If countries were required to import fixed quantities of wheat
annually, this might unfavorably affect their domestic producers in years
when foodgrain production was substantially increased and it might also
cause the countries to cut sharply their imports of rice and other food-
grains, Neither of these situations would be desirable.
To sum up, it seemed that even the poorest of the underdeveloped
countries should be required to import some wheat, but a relatively small
percentage, on commercial terms while countries with higher incomes
should be required to import progressively larger portions of their total
imports on commercial terms, Japan appeared to be rapidly approaching
a point where concessional terms might not be needed at all.
CHAPTER V
SUGGESTED RULES TOR EQUITABLE DISPOSALS
OF SURPLUS WHEAT
The conclusions from the preceding chapter seemed to present a
basis for a rule that might be followed in making concessional sales of
vvheat to underdeveloped countries, without seriously disrupting commer
cial exports to those areas. This basis and a proposed rule are offered
for consideration in the first part of this chapter.
If the exporting nations were to accept a rule along the lines of
the one proposed, they would also need a rule for determining which ex
porting country should supply specific requests for wheat on concessional
terms. The second section describes a basis and a rule that might be
appropriate for handling that problem,
A discussion follows on procedures that might be followed and on
anticipated results if the two proposed rules were to be adopted.
Alternate rules are suggested in the final section of the chapter.
A Rule for Maintaining Commercial Markets
The Basis
As a country*s per capita national incomeincreases, ordinarily
its need for foodgrains on concessional terms decreases.
The Proposed Rule
Underdeveloped countries that want to receive wheat on concessional
terms should agree to purchase on commercial terms a prescribed percentage
TABLE V. COMMERCIAL WHEAT IMPORTS REQUIRED OF UNDERDEVELOPED
NATIONS RECEIVING WHEAT Qi CONCESSIONAL TERMS
Per Capita
Income
50.00
75.00
100.00
125.00
150.00
175,00
200.00
225.00
250.00
Percent of Total Wheat Imports
Concessional Purchases
and Grants
Commercial Purchases
60
60
of their total import needs for that year — the percentage required to
depend on their par capita national income. An outline of this rule
is shown in Table V. The percentages were derived by using the 1957
imports and incomes of Japan and India as guidelines. Thus India with
a per capita income of about $61.00 was thought to have i ^ • *
mately 15% of its total wheat imports on commercial terms and Japan,
with a per capita income of about $250.00, appeared to have purchased
90% commercially. For Brazil and Pakistan in 1957, this rule would not
have required them to purchase commercially as much wheat as they did.
This does not however mean that they would have
imported approxi-
purchased less
commercially even if they could have, Drazil for example v;ould probably
still have maintained its commercial imports from Argentina and Uruguay
because of its interest in two-way trade vjith them.
The main features of the table are that it does not prescribe
absolute quantities and it provides for gradual changes as per capita
income rises. The quantity imported is thus affected by domestic food-
grain production, population and capita income as usual. This should
provide some protection for domestic producers and for countries that
export competing foodgrains. Having the percentage imported commercially
increase as income risei should assure the growth of the commercial
world market.
It was originally thought that the required commercial imports
could be purchased on the open market at competitive prices — the
importing country to be responsible for seeing that the required per
centage, with some allowance for convenience, were met. A strong case
however can be made for having at least part of the commercial purchases
1 7"tied-in"-^' with concessional deals. This would especially be true in
the cases where long-term deals are necessary and the country purchases
a major portion of its total wheat imports on concessional terms.
Exceptions to the rule might be made for countries having extreme
financial difficulties, even if their per capita incomes were over $250.00
and for "iron curtain" countries because of political reasons.
17This refers to an importing country agreeing to purchase speci
fied quantities commercially from the country supplying them wheat on
concessional terms.
A Rule for Supplying Concessional Wheat
A Basis
Each exporting country is its own best judge of what tt can afford
and wants to supply on concessional terms.
Since no one knows how long it will take the underdeveloped coun
tries to achieve a stage of self-sustained growth or how able they will
be to repay their debts when they fall due, the degree of aid extended
to them is still largely a moral and political question. The citizens
of each of the more-developed nations must decide for themselves the degree
to which they are willing and able to help the less fortunate countries.
^ of Precedence
A rule would be needed for cases in which more than one of the
exporting countries wanted to fill a specific request for wheat on con
cessional terms. An equitable rule might be to let the country with the
greatest surplus burden (using surplus as defined in Chapter II and
measuring burden by surplus per capita as shown in Table VI) have the
first chance to reduce its surplus by this method, if it wanted. looking
at Table Vi, it shows that Canada has had consistently the greatest bur
den. If the proposed rule had been in effect during those years, Canada
would have been first in line to decide whether or not ishe wanted to
make the concessional sales. In three of the years, Australia would
have had second chance, if Canada declined.
The rule may at first appear over-balanced in Canada's favori
1951
1952
TABLE VI. PER CAPITA WHEAT SURPLUS IN MAJOR
EXPORTING COUimiES, 1951-1957
United States Canada Al^s tralia
- bushels per capita
Argentina
^July 1 in the United States, August 1 in Canada^ and December 1
in Argentina and Australia.
It does not seem unfair if one considers that Canada*s population is only
1/10 of the United State's and its per capita income about 2/3 as much.
Furthermore, in calculating surplus, Canada's normal carryover amounted
to about ten bushels per capita while the United State's normal carry
over was less then three bushels per capita. The rule however might be
stated in terms of total agricultural surplus and this would make the
results somewhat different.
Anticipated Procedure
The major wheat exporting nations would need to form a small
working group to handle initial requests by underdeveloped countries for
wheat on concessional terms. This group could be composed of a represen
tative from each exporting country and perhaps one from the Food and
Agriculture Organization, They might meet in Washington, D.C. as all
the major wheat exporting nations have agricultural officers there who
could serve as their country's representative. The Pood and Agriculture
Organization maintains a staff there too. It would be of convenience
also because the United States would no doubt still handle most of the
requests for wheat on concessional terras.
The job of the working group would be to review the initial re
quests received. They could .check the requesting country's per capita
income according to U. N. figures, and determine the terms and conditions
which should apply. Then the request, along with the prescribed terms
and conditions could be transmitted to the exporting countries that have
indicated they are willing to make concessional sales. If more than one-
is willing, the one with the greatest per capita surplus would be allowed
to fill the request.
Anticipated Results
The results would probably not be a great deal different than
what is being accomplished under Public Law 480. However, the other
exporting countries would be able to reduce their surpluses on equal
terms with the United States, if they wanted, and they would be assured
of a chance to compete for the uncommitted commercial purchases required
of the underdeveloped countries. It would also enable them to go on re
cord as being in favor of a highly humanitarian program.
The United States on the other hand could shake off the charge
that she is dumping her wheat problem onto others and she might also be
able to expand concessional sales. It is doubtful that Canada and Aus
tralia would supply very large quantities on concessional terms and if
they are satisfied with the safeguards provided for commercial sales,
they should not mind the United States making even larger concessional
sales to countries that want them.
Benefits should also accrue to the underdeveloped countries. With
the major exporters holding huge surpluses and agreed on concessional
sales, they could reasonably count on having sizeable quantities of wheat
available on concessional terms for perhaps another five or ten years.
This would greatly aid their planning, especially since they would know
the approximate fuiut^ terms and conditions that would apply in their
case.
Alternate Proposals
There may be other rules and procedures that would be more readily'"
acceptable to the exporting nations,
One^such plan might be to have the underdeveloped countries sign
agreements to import set quantities of wheat yearly on commercial terms.
In return the exporters would agree to supply at prescribed concessional
terms the additional quantities they desired. This might require a more
elaborate administrative organization and the pledges of the exporters
to supply the necessary quantities. The quantities each should pledge,
might be equitably determined by placing the contributions of each
exporting country on a per capita income and population basis.
Another pi an n ight be to establish a multi-price system for ex
port wheat going to the underdeveloped countries. The price could depend
upon the per capita national income of the importing country. This sys
tem might be incorporated in with the International Wheat Agreement.
These two plans were not thought to be as desirable as the one
outlined in this cl.apter. The first alternate was considered too rigid
in its requirements for both importing and exporting countries. The
second alternate would probably raise serious problems for the less-
wealthy wheat exporting countries.
CHAFrER VI
SUMMARY
Whils carryover stocks of wheat have mounted to burdensome propor
tions in thd United States and some of the other more-developed nations,
a great need for more abundant foodgrain supplies exists in the under
developed g.reas of the world. Available evidence indicates that loans
and grants of surplus wheat can substantially aid the underdeveloped coun
tries in their efforts to promote economic growth and that their development
should be beneficial for all nations.
The United States in recent years lias acted as "food banker" for
the world. Over one billion bushels of wheat alone were shipped overseas
from July 1, 1954, to June 30, 1958, on concessional terms or as grants.
Both the receiving countries and the United States have been generally
pleased with the results but other wheat exporting countries have objected
vigorously. While they approved of grants to relief agencies and to coun
tries in times of emergencies, they contended tliat concessional sales reduced
their coiraoercial sales significantly and thereby caused them serious injury.
This apparently led the United States to curtail concessional sales to
industrialized countries and to invite the other major wheat exporting
nations to join her in sharing the wheat surpluses with the underdeveloped
countries.
A major obstacle blocking a cooperative agreement to share the
surpluses is the controversial issue of the level of commercial wheat
imports, if any, the underdeveloped countries should maintain in addition
to concessional imports and grants. The arguments range from those who
claim all underdeveloped areas could just as well be declared non-commercial
markets to those who contend a3.i concessional sales should be stopped.
The major purpose of this study was to attempt to uncover an objec
tive basis and some rules for determining the level of corammercial imports
an underdeveloped country should maintain in addition to imports on con
cessional terms and as grants. It was hypothesized that countries with
per capita incomes of under $100.00 were commercial importers only in
years of very low domestic production, and that per capita income is an
indicator of an underdeveloped country's relative importance as a commer
cial market for foreign wheat.
Terms and concepts regarding economic development and the wheat
surplus were defined and discussed, and a review was made of the world's
food and wheat situations and of the United State's wheat surplus disposal
programs. This was done to place the analysis that followed in a proper
perspective.
It .vas thought that much of the controversy over surplus disposals
was due to the surplus producing countries thinking of it primarily in
regard to their problems and only secondarily as a means of aiding the
underdeveloped countries. For that reason, the approach here was to con
sider mainly the needs and abilities of the underdeveloped countries.
A very generalized graphic analysis was made of the relationships
that existed between wheat imports and per capita foodgrain production
and per capita income in Brazil, India, Japan, and Pakistan for the years
1951-1957, The analysis showed that even the poorest countries may import
wheat commercially for reasons other than dire necessity and that there are
several factors that must be considered as influencing an underdeveloped
country's commercial imports oi wheat. It also led to the conclusion
that as a country's per capita income rises, ordinarily its need for con
cessional terms on foodgrain imports decreases.
Using the preceding conclusion as a basis, a rule was outlined that
would require countries seeking wheat on concessional terms to purchase
a prescribed percentage — the percentage to increase as per capita income
rises — of their total requirements of foreigh wheat on commercial terms.
For example, India would be required to purchase about 15 percent and
Japan about 90 percent commercially.
If such a rule were to be adopted by the surplus producing nations,
they would also need a rule for determining which of them should fill
specific requests for surplus wheat. It was proposed that the country
with the largest per capita wheat surplus burden be allowed the first
opportunity to fill the request and to reduce its surplus, if it wanted..
If not, the request vvould be offered to the country with the next highest
per capita surplus.
It was not thought that the rules suggested would require a great
deal of supervision or that the results would be much "different from
those of the present surplus disposal programs. However, it should assure
the exporting countries of commercial markets in the underdeveloped area*
and provide them with the opportunity to dispose of surpluses on equal
terms, if they want. The underdeveloped countries should gain by being
assured of the availability of wheat on concessional terms for some years
to come.
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APP2NDIX
TABLE VII, PER CAPITA NATIONAL INCOf'E IN 1957 FOR FORTY-SIX COUNTRIES
Country
Ar^fentina
Australia
Austria
Belgian Confjo
Belgium
Brazil
Burma
Canada
Cevlon
Chile
Colombia
Cuba
Denmark
EqTiador
Egypt "U
Finland
France
Germany, Vr,
Greece
Guatemala
Honduras
India l/
Indone'sia 2j
Iceland
IreOind
Israel
Italy
Japan
Korea, S,
Luxembourg
Kexioo
Netherlands
Norway
Pakistan
Peru 1/
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Svdtzerland
Thailand
Tturkey ""
Un, of So, Africa \/
United Kingdom "*
United States
Venezuela
Yugoslavia
Currency
Units
Peso
Pounds
Shilling
Franc
Flranc
Cruzeire
Kyat
Dollar
Rupee
Peso
Peso
Peso
Krone
Sucre
Pound
Marka
Franc
D.Mark
Drachma
Quetzal
Leropira
Rupee
Rupiah
Krona
Found
Pound
Lira
Yen
Hwan
Franc
Peso
Guilder
Krova
Rupee
Sol
Escudc
Peseta
Krona
Franc
Baht
Lira
Pound
Pound
Dollar
Bolivan
Dinar
Estimated National Income
TJomes-^0 li, S.
Currency
ons of
units)
188,520
4,625
98,500
48,820
413,500
873,300
4,450
23,834
5,067
1,766,400
12,054
2,320
27,020
9,733
" 913
898,600
15,680,000
160,300
70,647
559,2
595,2
114,100
91,600
3,800
465
2,518
12,231,000
8,251,600
1,606,500
16,900
92,000
28,800
22,805
20,987
22,061
50,400
391,400
48,301
27,280
34,950
27,426
1,701,7
17,604
364,000
16,559
1,816,000
Dollars
Estimate Per
of Vdd-year Capita
population Income
tU, S.
(millions) (thousnnds) dollars)
5,096 19,668 256
10,360 9,643 1,074
3,788 6,997 541
976 13,124 74
8,270 8,989 920
9,650 61,268 158
934 20,054 47
24,856 16,589 1,498
1,064 9,165 116
2,279 7,121 320
4,822 13,227 365
2,320 6,410 362
3,912 4,500 869
649 3,890 167
2,622 24,026 109
3,907 4,336 901
37,334 44,091 847
38,167 53,692 711
2,355 8,096 291
559 3,451 162
298 1,769 168
23,961 392,440 61
8,035 80,500 100
233 165 1,412
1,302 2,885 451
1,399 1,937 722
19,570 48,483 404
22,923 90,900 252
22,303
338 316 1,070
7,360 31,426 234
7,580 11,021 688
3,193 3,494 914
4,407 84,450 52
1,161 9,923 117
1,753 8,909 197
9,319 29,431 317
9,337 7,367 1,267
6,348 5,117 1,241
1,688 21,076 80
9,794 25,500 384
4,765 14,167 336
49,291 51,455 958
364,000 171,360 . 2,124
4,943 6,134 806
6,053 18,005 336
1956 estimated
2j 1954 estimated
1955 estimated
.°^ Statistics. Vol. XIII, No. 4, StatisticalOffice of the United Nations; New Yorlc7 1959,
TABIE TEII. INDEX NUMBERS OF PER CAi'ITA PRODUCT AT CONSTANT PRICES'
FOR FORTY-rCVE GOUiJTRIES
61
Country 1953 1954 1955 1956
1957
Argentina^
Austria
Belgian Congo^
Belgivim
Brazil^
Biurma
Canada
Ceylon
Chile
Columbia
Cuba
Denn-)ark
Ecuador
Finland^
France
Gerirany, V7,
Greece
Guatemala
Honduras
loelar.d
India
Ireland
Irrael
Italy> c
Japan '
Korea, S,^
Morocco^*^
Netherlands
Norway . _
Pakistan^*^
Peru
Portugal
Puerto Rico"''
Rhodesia and
Nyasaland, Fed,
Spain^
Sweden
SwitzTcrland^
Thailand!
Turkey
United Kingdoml
Venezuela
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
ion
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
102
110
100
103
103
103
94
98
94
98
106
105
101
107
ICS
104
106
102
95
98
109
101
102
120
104
101
108
104
105
103
106
104
ICl
104
102
110
112
106
105
94
88
104
104
104
122
104
107
108
109
100
104
95
94
104
119
100
1C6
113
110
117
110
103
97
118
102
104
128
111
108
111
108
118
98
112
105
98
110
105
104
108
113
109
110
92
107
108
101
129
104
111
108
110
105
99
90
94
1Q4
101
106
115
114
123
117
113
96
122
105
103
133
115
117
106
111
119
115
108
103
112
110
104
117
111
115
108
119
Note: Unless otherwise stated, the index numbers relate to per capita gross
national product at market price,
^Per Capita gross domestic product at market prices.
Per capita gross domestic product at factor cost,
^ears ending 30 September of year stated,
^Per capita net national product at factor cost,
^ear beginning 1 April of year stated.
103
136
104
112
110
101
107
106
109
115
121
128
126
117
121
122
127
118
117
110
102
111
107
123
115
117
98
110
135
TABLE VIII. FOOTTTOTES CONTiKUED
^Former FrenoL Zone only,
^Year beginning 1 July of year stated,
®Per capita net national product at in'irket prices.
Source: Statistical Yearbook 195P. pp. 429-431, United Nations; New York, 1958,
TABIjE IX. PER CAl^ITA PRODUCT GRQVmi AND PER CAPITA
NATIONAL INCOJ.ffi FOR FORTf COUNTRIES
Annual Rate of Per
Capita Product Growth
(Average 1953-57)
Less than l.CC^
Argentina
Canada
Chile
Honduras
Pakistan
Thailand
Tvirkey
United States
to
Belgian Congo
Ceylon
Colombia
Denmark
India
Ireland
2.0 ^ 2.90^
Brazil
Ecuador
Norway
Portugal
United Kingdom
3.0 to 3.99?g
Belgium
Finland
Luxembourg
Sweden
Per Capita
Income
(1957)
U.S
256
1,498
320
168
80
384
2,124
74
116
365
869
61
451
158
167
914
197
958
920
901
1,070
1,267
Annual Rate of Per
Capita Product Growth
(Average 1953-67)
4.0 to 4.9?^
Burma
Guatamala
Netherlands
Peru
Switzerland
and over
Austria
Cuba
France
Germany ,Yr^
Greece
Iceland
Israel
Italy
Japan
Mexico
Spain
Venezuela
Source: Adapted from TABLES VII and VIII on the preceding papes
Per Capita
Income
(1957)
162
688
117
1,241
541
362
847
711
291
1,412
722
404
252
234
317
806
63
TABLE X. WIEA.T, SUPPLY AND DISTRIBUl'ION IN UNITED STATES,
CANADA, ARGENTINA, AND AUvSTRALIA
Carryover
stocks Production
Domestic Domestic Exports Total
suj^ly use including disap—
^ 1/ flour pearance
Yearbcffinnin;! July 1
ipsi-sr
1952-53
1953-54
1954-55
1955-56
1956-57
1957-58
1958-59
3^871
255,978
605,544
933,506
1,036,178
1,033,415
908,606
880,471
Year bef^innin^ August 1
^ 189,263
1952-53 217,178
1953-54 383,135
1954-55 618,675
1955-56 536,748
1956-57 579,574
1957-58 729,546
1958-59 614,764
Year beginning December 1
1951-52
1952-53
1953-54
1954-55
1955-56
1956-57
1957-58
1958-59 •
20,Cn0
5,090
73,3Q0
60,3.00
88,000
55,000
70,000
60,000
Year beginning December 1
1,000 bushels
United States
988,1"5T 173^^32
1,306,440 1,562,418
1,173,071 1,778,615
983,900 1,917,406
934,731 1,970,909
1,004,272 2,037,687
950,662 1,859,468
1,462,218 2,342,689
553,678
701,973
634,040
331,981
519,178
573,040
370,508
368,730
Canada
"742,881
919,151
1,017,225
950,656
1,055,926
1,152,614
1,100,054
983,494
Argentina
77,161
280,500
227,800
282,560
192,900
261,980
214,000
225,000
97,161
285,500
301,100
342,860
280,9fX)
316,980
284,000
Australia
657,185
639,891
628,175
607,342
591,696
597,936
577,301
169.878
150,441
143,469
161,999
167,170
161,272
169,696
88,375
130,235
128,568
122,176
128,443
147,141
152,385
474,869
316,983
216,934
273,806
345,798
548,945
401,696
355,825
385,525
255,081
251,909
309,182
261,796
315,594
3,786
81,965
112,232
132,684
97,457
99,839
71,615
1,132,054
956,874
845,109
881,228
937,494
1,128,881
978,997
525,703
535,966
398,550
413,908
476,352
423,068
485,290
92,161
212,200
240,800
254,860
225,900
246,980
224,000
1951-52 19,500 159,725 179,225 80,625 81,600 162,225
1952-53 17,000 195,208 212,208 72,879 101,329 174,208
1953-54 38,000 198,000 236,000 76,926 65,574 142,500
1954-55 93,500 168,610 262,110 68,848 98,262 167,310
1955-56 95,000 196,000 291,000 72,503 131,497 204,000
1956-57 87,000 134,500 221,500 74,512 103,988 178,500
1957-58 43,000 97,570 140,570 81,970 48,600 130,570
1958-59 • 10,000 210,000 220,000
2/ Does not include imported wheat, v/hich for the United States totaled 11,1
million bushels in 1957-58 and averaged 13,2 million for the 6 years 1951-56,
Imports into the other countries were generally very small except in 1951-52 when
around 8 million bushels were imported into Argentina,
• Preliminary, estimates
Source: Grain Market News, Vol, VII, No, 2, Agricultural Marketing Service:
Washington, D, c,, l959, "
TABLE XI. V.TiEAT: WORLD PRODUCTION, AVAILABLE SUPPLY,
AND APPARENT DISAPPEARANCE, 1951-1958
Year^ Production Carry-in^ Available Carry-out^ Apparent
Stocks Supply Stocks Utilization
6,435
7,505
7,390
6,945
7,400
7,795
7,645
8,715
— million bushels —
1,100
1,706
1,756
1,755
1,751
1,565
7,064
8,000
8,490
8,651
9,156
9,550
9,396
10,280
1,000
1,706
1,756
1,755
1,751
1,565
6,569
6,900
6,784
6,895
7,401
7,799
7,831
^Crop years.
2
Carryovers in United States, Canada, Argentina and Australia.
*Not available.
Sources: Foreign Agricultural Trade. Statistical Handbook, Statistical
Bulletin No. 179, Foreign Agricultural Service: Washington,
D. C., 1956.
The Wheat Situation, WS-151 and VvS-163, Agricultural Marketing
Service; Washington, D. C., 1956 and 1959.
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